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The influence of taxes on migration:
evidence from Switzerland
Thomas Liebig and Alfonso Sousa-Poza*
Empirical studies on the impact of taxation on migration have been limited by
a lack of comparable data in an international context and a lack of variation in tax
burdens within countries. A notable exception to the latter is Switzerland. Prior
empirical studies on tax competition in Switzerland have had to rely on aggregated
data. In general, these studies have been supportive of the notion of tax
competition, i.e., high earners tend to relocate to low-tax regions. The authors
use an alternative panel approach based on micro-data from the first three waves of
the newly established Swiss Household Panel. Despite active community tax
policies aimed at attracting new residents and a significant increase in tax-burden
dispersion among communities in the past decade, no tax-induced migration is
observed. Migration decisions are found to be strongly influenced by accommo-
dation-related factors that point to important housing-market effects.
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1. Introduction
Although the impact of income tax competition on migration has—since the seminal
contribution of Tiebout (1956)—been extensively discussed in the literature, it has only
recently emerged on the agenda of policy-makers, particularly in the European Union. At
the same time, various OECD countries, including Germany, are discussing more tax
autonomy for local governments (see OECD, 1999A). The main argument is greater
efficiency, i.e., that local governments can adapt better to the preferences and needs of
their respective constituencies. In addition, from a political-economy perspective, fiscal
decentralisation may limit government growth by preventing excessive taxation and
increasing government accountability. In contrast, local governments may engage in
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wasteful competition for taxpayers, which could also distort migration decisions. With the
ongoing integration of the European Union and decreasing migration costs, the discussion
has gained further impetus and has been placed on the international political agenda.
Indeed, there are many similarities between fiscal relations across the European Union and
within an individual country (Joumard and Konsgrud, 2003, p. 20). Accordingly, research
efforts aimed at the interaction between migration and taxation have intensified, and
tax competition through personal income tax have become a major concern among
policy-makers.
Despite numerous theoretical contributions, empirical studies on the effect of taxation
on migration are still very rare. This scarcity applies especially to studies based on micro-
data. Such a deficiency can be attributed primarily to two phenomena. First, even though
tax considerations influence the net return onmigration, they are not the sole determinants
of migration.1 Therefore, they cannot be easily isolated from other factors which also
determine the net return such as wages, local amenities, housing prices and migration
costs. In addition, these factors intervene with ‘locational’ preferences and subjective
evaluations. Second, labour is neither as homogeneous nor as mobile as capital. Moreover,
host countries place restrictions on the immigration of labour, which makes studies on the
impact of tax considerations largely infeasible in an international context.
In principle, one could also study the internal migration of individuals within the
European Union, especially as nationals from EU countries enjoy freedom of movement
throughout the Union and tax rates vary widely. Nevertheless, to date, empirical studies on
tax competition in the European Union have concentrated on capital tax competition—
which is fundamentally different from income tax competition, inter alia because mobility
costs are considerably lower and preferences do not play a role. Altshuler and Goodspeed
(2002) estimate reaction functions between EU countries in a Nash competition model.
While they find evidence for a strategic setting of capital taxation, they find no support for
strategic interaction with respect to the tax burden on labour. This finding is not surprising
as, within the European Union, structural and institutional differences between countries
are generally too large to allow isolation of the impact of a particular factor like taxation on
migration, particularly if based on aggregated data.
One way of overcoming the above-mentioned obstacles is to focus on internal migration
in countries that have a decentralised tax structure. However, only a few countries have
such a structure. Among these, Switzerland stands out as the nation with the largest
variation in tax rates at the sub-central level. In the US, which also has a decentralised tax
structure, less than 10% of local communities levy income taxes, and the rates are generally
low (see Wallace and Edwards, 1999). Therefore, some of the most prominent empirical
studies on tax competition are based on Swiss data, including the contributions of Feld and
Kirchga¨ssner (2001) and Kirchga¨ssner and Pommerehne (1996). Yet it should be noted
that these studies are based on aggregated data. Clearly, then, an analysis using micro-data
is desirable, as it allows for the control of the individual characteristics that determine the
migration decision and avoids the endogeneity problems inherent in aggregated data in the
context of tax competition. Such an empirical study using micro-data is now possible
because of the newly established Swiss Household Panel.
The aim of this paper is to analyse the impact of the tax burden on migration in the Swiss
context. In contrast to earlier studies, we are not only able to conduct an analysis based on
1 According to the human capital theory of migration, which was introduced by Sjastaad (1962), the
migration decision is determined by its net discounted return. For an overview of migration models, see e.g.,
Massey et al. (1993).
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micro-data but also to cover the whole of Switzerland. As Switzerland is the OECD
country with the largest variation in income tax rates across local communities, we are able
to fill an important gap in the growing empirical literature on the impact of taxes on
migration. Prior empirical studies from other countries have been largely inconclusive, not
surprisingly given that local communities in other countries do not have much income tax
autonomy. Thus, these studies have had to rely on other fiscal parameters such as welfare
payments and property taxes. In contrast, we have a direct measure of the tax burden and
are therefore able to analyse its effect on migration directly.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the theoretical background for the
ensuing analysis. Section 3 briefly sketches selected prior literature on migration and tax
competition, with particular reference to the Swiss case. Section 4 then summarises some
important particularities of the Swiss tax system. Section 5 presents the data and
methodology of the empirical analysis the results of which are then discussed in Section
6. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2. Theoretical considerations
The impact of tax rates on an individual’s migration decision is relatively straightforward.
For John Hicks (1932, p. 76), the incentives for migration were clear: ‘[D]ifferences in net
economic advantages, chiefly differences in wages, are the main causes of migration.’ This
concept of differences in net economic advantages, which became the starting point for the
traditional economic migration literature, has since been formalised by Todaro (1969) and
Harris and Todaro (1970). In a setting with multiple prospective destinations, migration
takes place into country j in which the net expected income stream Vj(0) is maximised (j ¼
0 for the country of origin and j ¼ 1, 2, etc. for the prospective destinations):1
j 2 arg max
j
Vjð0Þ¼
Zn
t¼0
½pjðtÞð1 tjÞYjðtÞertdtf0for j¼ 0;Cjð0Þotherwiseg ð1Þ
where V(0) is the expected discounted net present value of the income gain frommigration
over the time horizon n, r is the discount rate, C(0) represents the migration costs, Y(t) are
wages at time t, t is the respective effective tax rate and pj(t) is the probability of being
employed.
The hypothesis is straightforward: Persons with a higher income also pay more taxes for
given rates and face a higher tax burden. People with a high tax burden should, ceteris
paribus, be more inclined to migrate for fiscal reasons.
However, it is likely that the entire family rather than the individual is the relevant
decision-making unit. Mincer (1978) used the concept of family ties to explain migration
propensities of families vis-a`-vis individuals, concluding that these attachments deter
migration, particularly in the presence of working spouses. We should therefore observe
a negative correlation between family (household) size and the migration inclination.
Moreover, a migration decision that is optimal for the entire family is not necessarily
optimal for each individual. In terms of formula (1a), the original Vj(0) now becomes
1 In addition, net wages should be adjusted for purchasing power by multiplying the net terms by some
purchasing power measurement.
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a sum of Vij(0), with i ¼ 1, 2, . . . , representing the various family members. The new
maximisation problem for a family f of size m is therefore
j 2 arg max
j
Vjð0Þ¼ arg max
j
+
m
i¼1
Vij[Vf ð0Þ ð1aÞ
The net family income, however, has to be adjusted for location-specific utility, which is
derived from the consumption of generally available goods on the one hand and from
tangible and intangible location-specific goods and services such as proximity to relatives,
area amenities, climate, security and quality of life on the other. A household’s utility can
thus be represented by a utility functionU of the following form (Wallace et al., 1997, 40ff)
U ¼UðX1;X2; . . . ;Xk;Zkþ1;Zkþ2; . . . ;ZkþlÞ; ð2Þ
where Xa (a ¼ 1, 2, . . . , k) denotes the goods and services that can be consumed
independently from a specific location. Zb (b ¼ kþ1, kþ2, . . . , kþl) depicts location-
specific goods (i.e., not all the Zb are available at every locality) for each location j, and only
the available goods are included. The household’s (static) choice is thus constrained by
location-specific budget functions, expressed as follows
Yj ¼ +
k
a¼1
vaXaþ +
kþl
b¼kþ1
vbZb; ð3Þ
where va, vb are the prices of the respective goods and services.
Equation (3) can also be interpreted as the point of departure for the literature on tax
competition. Tiebout (1956) argued that competing local governments offer different tax
and expenditure packages.1 If people are sufficientlymobile, theymigrate to the community
with the tax/expenditure package that corresponds to their preferences. In equilibrium, an
efficient allocation of resources emerges—no individual can improve his or her utility by
moving to another community. ATiebout equilibriumwithoutmigration only arises if taxes
are used to finance public goods and are not aimed at redistributing income (see alsoHansen
and Kessler, 2001).2 Furthermore, the Tiebout model should only apply to an agglomer-
ation area, as it ignores the fact that most jobs are bound to a specific workplace. For a given
job, a Tiebout-type migration should only occur within a distance in which commuting is
possible (see Mieszowski and Zodrow, 1989). Notwithstanding these restrictions, the
resulting Tiebout equilibrium is consistent with jurisdictions that have different tax
schemes, i.e., differing tax rates may reflect varying demands for certain public goods.3
Furthermore, Oates (1969) has argued that differences in taxes and local public goods
should be capitalised in the community’s property values. If changes in the community tax
burden were instantaneously capitalised, this would inhibit tax-induced migration. How-
ever, there are both theoretical and empirical arguments for a less-than-full capitalisation of
fiscal differences in housing and property values, particularly regarding income taxes (see
Feld, 2000, for an overview).More important, capitalisation should have different effects on
different population groups, because income tax capitalisation does not depend on the
respective household income, and preferences for housing size may differ among house-
holds. We might then observe migration due to housing effects but not taxation.
1 The original model was non-formal but has received formalisation and adaptation in the work of Oates
(1972) and others. An overview of the Tiebout literature is provided in Dowding and John (1994).
2 Of course, if redistribution is part of an individual’s utility function, (some) redistribution does not prevent
a Tiebout equilibrium without fiscally induced migration.
3 In general, the Tiebout literature emphasises the favourable aspects of fiscal federalism, whereas the tax
competition literature (in the more stringent sense) focuses on the distortionary effects of different tax rates
on the efficiency of allocation (see Brueckner, 2004, for a comparison).
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InaTiebout setting,migrationoccursunderonly twocircumstances: either the individual’s
preference structure changes (e.g., owing to marriage or birth of a child) and/or the
equilibrium is (at least temporarily) disrupted by changes in community fiscal policies. The
latter point is of importance in Switzerland, because many communities adjust their fiscal
policies to attract certainmigrant groups. Yet, despite tax harmonisation efforts at the federal
level, the dispersion of tax rates has increased (OECD, 1999B). Our own calculations using
data from the Federal Tax Administration show that, on average, between 1995 and 2000
the tax burden at the community level declined, while the standard deviation increased.
Therefore, the observed migration in Switzerland cannot simply be attributed a priori to
changes in individual preference structures.
3. Prior empirical studies
A large and varied body of work exists on the determinants of migration, each study
focusing on particular aspects of the migration decision (see Ghatak et al., 1996, for an
overview). Likewise, a substantial amount of both theoretical and empirical literature
addresses the economic effects of tax competition on individuals and households (see
Wilson, 1999, for an overview). Nevertheless, empirical studies on tax competition
between governments that focus on differences in income tax rates are still rare, owing
primarily to lack of data. Only a few OECD countries have a truly decentralised income tax
structure. Among these countries, Switzerland stands out as the country with the largest
variation of tax rates at the sub-central level.1
The earliest study of tax competition in the Swiss context dates back to Frey (1981), who
studied migration in the region of Basle and found no evidence for tax competition.
Similarly, Feld (2000), in his analysis of aggregate migration flows among Swiss cantons,
finds no evidence for fiscally induced migration at that level. In the related field of public
expenditure, Schaltegger (2003) finds no robust evidence for an impact of migration on
cantonal public expenditure. Tabin and Keller (2003), in an analysis of whether different
social expenditures across the French part of Switzerland induce migration, conclude that
family and job-related factors are the prime motives of migration, while social welfare does
not seem to affect movement. In contrast, Joumard and Giorno (2002) conclude in their
OECD survey on public expenditure in Switzerland that welfare claimants appear to
relocate to communities with generous social assistance programmes.
Kirchga¨ssner and Pommerehne (1996), by regressing the shares of income groups across
cantons on cantonal tax burdens, industry and infrastructure, find evidence that tax rates
have an influence on the distribution of high-income earners across cantons. Furthermore,
tax differences seem to be partly capitalised in rents. Feld and Kirchga¨ssner (2001) test
Tiebout’s club hypothesis in a Swiss context with aggregated data from the 137 largest
Swiss communities by regressing the share of various income classes on income tax rates
and find evidence for tax competition in Switzerland. However, Schmidheiny (2003)
criticises these aggregated approaches for neglecting the inherent endogeneity problem in
aggregated data, i.e., because community characteristics are influenced by the choices of
the inhabitants, only from the perspective of the individual household can community
characteristics be accepted as a given. This endogeneity problem is a strong argument in
favour of micro-data analysis. Schmidheiny (2003) circumvents the data problem by
1 However, several countries—including the US—have substantial variation in local property taxes. Thus,
a variety of empirical studies are concerned with this kind of tax competition, including Brett and Pinske
(2000), Brueckner and Saavedra (2001) and Revelli (2002). The analysis of tax competition via property
taxes is, however, fundamentally different (see Mieszkowski and Zodrow, 1989).
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focusing on household-level data on migration in the urban agglomeration of Basle in
1997, for which a unique dataset is available. His findings suggest that rich households are
significantly more likely than poor households to move to low-tax communities.
To date, however, to our knowledge, no empirical studies on the impact of different
income tax rates on migration exist that both employ micro-data and cover large areas.
Given that Switzerland alone has sufficient variation in income tax rates to motivate fiscally
induced migration, this research void is not surprising. Only with the recently established
Swiss Household Panel has a micro-dataset become available that allows for an in-depth
and nation-wide analysis of fiscally induced migration.
4. Institutional background
Switzerland’s tax system reflects the country’s federal structure and is unique in several
aspects. Of the countries surveyed in OECD (1999A), Switzerland has the highest sub-
central government tax share. Only Canada (not surveyed in OECD, 1999A) has a higher
share of sub-national government tax receipts. However, in Canada, because income taxes
are mainly set at the provincial level, these receipts account for less than 10% of local
government tax revenues (see Joumard and Kongsrud, 2003). In Switzerland (in contrast
to other decentralised countries like the US where property taxes are the most prominent
local source of revenue), the main local tax sources are personal income taxes. Moreover,
Switzerland stands out among OECD countries as the nation in which local governments
use their tax-setting autonomy most effectively.1 For example, the cantons are largely
autonomous in setting their income taxes, both regarding the base and the rates. The local
communities can also set their own tax rates within the respective cantonal framework.
Admittedly, some harmonisation of cantonal tax structures was achieved in 2000 and
2001; however, this harmonisation covered primarily tax bases and time of taxation.2 As
a result, for each of the almost 3,000 communities, different tax rates still apply and
dispersion is large.
To illustrate this, in the year 2000, for an unmarried individual with no children earning
100,000 Swiss Francs per year, the combined cantonal and local tax burden across
Switzerland in communities with more than 2000 inhabitants varied from 8,954 Swiss
Francs in Freienbach (Canton Schwyz) to 22,784 Swiss Francs in Le-Chaux-de-Fonds
(Canton Neuchaˆtel). At the top income levels, differences inmarginal rates were evenmore
pronounced. Marginal rates at an annual income of 500,000 Swiss Francs ranged from
about 21% (again in Freienbach, Canton Schwyz) to more than 46% (in Lauterbrunn,
Canton Berne).3 Even in communities lying less than 20 km apart, differences in average
and marginal effective tax rates of more than 5% are quite common. This unique situation
makes Switzerland a particularly interesting country for analysing the impact of different
tax rates on migration. In contrast to internal migration in, for example, the US or the
European Union, people may migrate solely for tax reasons and later commute without also
having to change employment. In other words, if tax competition matters, it should exhibit
a measurable impact in Switzerland.
1 In Nordic countries, local governments also have de jure discretion to set tax rates, but they do not make
effective use of this autonomy. Local governments may avoid aggressive tax competition so as not to
jeopardise either cooperation in other areas or receipt of vertical government transfers, which often have
scope for discretion (Joumard and Kongsrud, 2003).
2 For a comprehensive overview of the Swiss tax structure and its implications for tax competition, see
Waldburger (2003).
3 These rates include all government levels.
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5. Data and methodology
Our overall empirical task is to measure the effectiveness of the widely practised tax-
policy measures that communities use to attract new residents. Thus, the focus of our study
is to analyse the impact of an individual’s tax burden on his or her migration decision.
We conducted this analysis using the first three waves of the Swiss Household Panel
(1999–2001), a longitudinal panel survey whose data are gathered annually using CATI
(Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing). For the first wave, a representative sample
of 5,074 households from the Swiss population was recruited and a total of 12,931
individuals were interviewed in the autumn of 1999. For 2001, the sample size of the panel
was equal to 4,314 households comprising 11,116 individuals. Our analysis is restricted to
individuals aged 20 and older.
Two unique features make the Swiss Household Panel particularly interesting for our
purposes. First, it is a very rich dataset that includes information on income and taxes and
thus provides data on individual tax burdens.1 The exact wording of the underlying
question is as follows: ‘What is the total amount paid yearly by your household in taxes
(communal, cantonal, and federal taxes)?’. The panel also contains very rich subjective
information, including data on the reasons for migration, which are obviously of particular
importance for our analysis.2 Second, data are available at the household level, which is—
according to the ‘family migration theory’ outlined in Section 2—the relevant decision-
making unit for migration. We define ‘migrants’ as individuals who change their place of
residence (as opposed to locality, which would also include movers within a given
community). In the pooled sample, 285 households changed place of residency in either
1998 or 1999. For the sociodemographic characteristics at the individual level, we use the
information provided by the individual with the highest personal income—assuming this
person to be the most relevant for the migration decision—subsequently referred to as the
‘household head’.
Our empirical analysis proceeds as follows. Using data from the 1999 panel, we first
present some descriptive information on the features of migrants and compare these with
those of non-migrants. In a subsequent step, we use a Cox proportional hazard rate
regression model to determine which factors influence the length of stay in the current
place of residency. This analysis is possible because the Swiss Household Panel supplies
information on the length of stay prior to the movements. The Cox model, a duration
analysis that models the probability of an exit (i.e., a move), is based on the following
hazard function
lðtÞ[eb#xl0ðtÞ; ð4Þ
where l0 depicts the so-called ‘baseline’ hazard (i.e., the probability of a move) and reflects
individual heterogeneity. In principle, would have to be estimated for each observation;
however, Cox (1972) has shown that the individual bs may be estimated without also
explicitly estimating. These estimated bs show the effect of a change in an independent
variable in X on the hazard rate (see, e.g., Greene, 1997, pp. 997–9; Wooldridge 2002, pp.
685–91). If the estimated coefficient b^j is greater than zero, a positive relation between the
variableXj and the hazard rate exists, i.e., persons with a high value ofXj are more inclined
1 Regarding the reliability of income data collected by recall questions, see Bell (1984), Juster and Smith
(1997), and Sousa-Poza and Henneberger (2000). See also Cattaneo and Winkelmann (2003), who use the
Swiss Household Panel data to study the earnings differentials of German and French speakers in Switzerland
2 Similar panel datasets from other countries, such as the German Socio-Economic Panel, do not contain
a comparable variable.
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to migrate and vice versa. Our base Model 1 contains only basic sociodemographic
characteristics as explanatory variables, i.e., the number of persons in the household,
whether the household has school age children, the age of the household head, his or her
employment status and education level and, finally, whether or not the individual
concerned is a foreigner. Model 2 adds further sociodemographic variables such as
duration of residency, home ownership and external childcare. This latter variable, by
indicating whether the household has used (paid) external childcare, shows whether the
community provides such facilities. Model 3 expands the basic model with dummies for
agglomeration and for the Italian- and French-language regions of Switzerland.
A second set of models includes a tax burden measurement, constructed using the self-
reported tax and income data from the questionnaires. Whereas Model 4 uses only the tax
burden and household income, Model 5 also adds the sociodemographic variables from
Model 1. In a third dataset, we include controls for a variety of variables that correspond to
public goods.
An alternative approach is to take tax payments as the dependent variable and analyse
whether migration affects these payments. This analysis can be done using a first-
difference estimator. In a two-period case (as applicable here), the first-difference model is
equivalent to the traditional fixed-effect model, i.e., it leads to identical estimators and test
statistics. However, heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors can be more easily
derived using the first-difference estimator (see Wooldridge 2003, p. 467).
In Switzerland, the tax payment Ti depends on six factors—fiscal year, income, marital
status, number of children, locality and tax deductions—which can be specified as follows
Tit ¼ d0d2001þb1Xitþaiþ eit ð5Þ
where d2001 is a dummy variable for the year 2001, capturing the general time trend. The
variables included inX are income, marital status and the number of children.With ai, we try
to capture the unobservable, individual and relatively time-independent factors that affect tax
deductions. In the Swiss context, these include mortgage payments and contributions to
pension funds within the second and, partly, third pillar.1
Thus, the tax rate in the two respective survey periods (1999 and 2001) can be
explained as
Ti3 ¼ d0þb1Xi3þaiþ ei3 ð5aÞ
Ti1 ¼b1Xi1þaiþ ei1 ð5bÞ
The difference of the two equations leads us to the first-difference equation
Ti3Ti1 ¼ d0þb1ðXi3Xi1Þþðei3 ei1Þ ð6Þ
which no longer contains the individual, unobserved heterogeneity ai. This model now
relates differences in the tax payments to changes in the observed characteristics. If
a change of locality influences the tax payments, then there should be a correlation between
ðei3  ei1Þ and past migration between 1999 and 2001.
The first-difference analysis is followed by another set of Cox analyses that focus on
other determinants of internal migration. We first run separate duration analyses for
employed persons only, to analyse whether job-related issues determine migration. This
1 Switzerland’s pension system is based on three pillars. The first pillar is a minimum state pension, the
second is based on fully funded occupational benefit plans, and the third is composed of individual retirement
savings through contributions that are partly tax deductible (see OECD, 2000, for details).
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step is followed by a second set of duration analyses which control for subjective
perceptions of various location factors.
The Swiss Household Panel survey for the second and third wave also includes a unique
question on the reasons for a change of locality. This item allows identification of the
impact of income and other sociodemographic factors on the self-reported reasons for
migration. We first classify the reasons into four categories—accommodation-related,
personal, locality-related and ‘other’ reasons for moving—then subsequently run a multi-
nomial logit model that captures the determinants of an individual’s migration decision.
Even though each respondent can state up to three reasons for migrating, we only consider
the prime reasons in the multinomial logit regressions. The analysis is conducted using the
pooled sample of the second and third waves. The independent variables include
household size, age, education, Swiss citizenship and whether or not the respondent has
school-age children. Because, in addition to tax burden, more than 30 migration motives
were classified (see the Appendix for the main variable definitions), these data provide
a clear picture of the reasons why people migrate and, more importantly, whether this
migration is in any way fiscally induced.
6. Empirical analysis
In our sample, while 285 households moved in either 1998 or 1999, 3,393 households did
not change their place of residency. Thus, we first conduct an analysis of variance between
these two groups. The results are presented in Table 1.
In this descriptive analysis, the main predictions of migration theory are confirmed:
migrants are significantly younger (meaning that migration is more likely to pay off owing
to the larger planning horizon), but home ownership and employment reduce the
probability of migration (because of the higher opportunity costs of migration). Further-
more, both employed and unemployed persons are more prone to migrate than non-
employed people (i.e., individuals who are not in the labour force). Finally, the average
length of residence for movers is significantly lower than that for non-movers, and
foreigners (being less likely to have accumulated location-specific social capital) are more
inclined to migrate. Particularly noteworthy is the lack of any significant difference
between the groups in either tax burden or gross household income.
To test whether these basic descriptive results hold after other factors are controlled for,
we proceed with a series of duration analyses that depict the determinants of migration (see
Equation 4). The results are shown in Table 2. Migrants are typically younger than non-
migrants. The probability of migration also declines with increasing household size, i.e.,
larger households tend to migrate less. As indicated by Equation (1b) above, a migration
that would be beneficial from the individual perspective of the household head is not
necessarily utility augmenting from the perspective of the entire family (or, more broadly
defined, the corresponding household). Thus, migration is less likely to occur in large
households, which is confirmed by our data. In addition, foreigners tend to have
a significantly higher migration inclination than natives. Even though foreigners’ move-
ments may be restricted across Switzerland (see Liebig, 2003), this result indicates that
foreigners are quite mobile within cantons. There are two possible explanations for this
result. First, the migration decision may be sequential in nature, i.e., foreigners may have
only limited information in the beginning, then change their location as soon as the
information asymmetries are lower. Second, the attachment to a certain community may
be lower, e.g., owing to the lack of family and friendship ties.
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In addition, home ownership has a significant negative effect, which is not surprising
given that home ownership increases the opportunity costs of migration. What may be
surprising, however, is that education appears to have no significant impact on the
migration decision. However, the signs in our base model correspond to theoretical
predictions that time-equivalent migration costs decrease relative to qualification level.1
Also worth noting is the significant impact of the employment variable. A priori, one would
expect employed people to be less likely to migrate. Yet some of the movements may be job
related (see Table 6 below). Moreover, the reference category ‘non-employment’ is
somewhat difficult to interpret, as it encompasses, inter alia, retired and handicapped
people—who are less likely to migrate. The net impact of these factors is therefore
ambiguous.2
In the next step, depicted in Table 3, we include a variable for the individual tax burden.
Its coefficient is not significant, and the inclusion of the tax burden does not improve the fit
of the model (x2 ¼ 1.572; p ¼ 0.456). Thus, these results strongly suggest that there is no
relation between migration and tax burden in Switzerland.3
The results of our first-difference analysis (Equation 6) confirm this result. They show
that—as would be expected—differences in income have a strong and highly significant
impact on tax payment (coefficient 0.022; std error 0.006). The number of children has the
Table 1. Determinants of internal migration—descriptive information
Movers Stayers Significanceb
Tax burden 0.119 (221) 0.131 (2541) 0.376
Annual gross household income
(in Swiss Francs)
90,953 (275) 89,998 (3093) 0.815
Household size 2.46 (285) 2.85 (3393) 0.171
Child of school agea 0.13 (285) 0.13 (3393) 0.904
Age 37.98 (285) 47.11 (3393) 0.000
Low educationa 0.11 (285) 0.17 (3393) 0.013
High educationa 0.13 (285) 0.12 (3393) 0.536
Employmenta 0.88 (285) 0.75 (3393) 0.000
Unemploymenta 0.03 (285) 0.01 (3393) 0.011
Foreignera 0.17 (285) 0.11 (3393) 0.002
Duration of residency (years) 14.12 (285) 20.92 (3391) 0.000
Home ownershipa 0.14 (285) 0.43 (3393) 0.000
External childcarea 0.07 (285) 0.04 (3393) 0.010
Agglomerationa 0.63 (285) 0.57 (3393) 0.059
Italian language regiona 0.04 (285) 0.04 (3393) 0.482
French language regiona 0.32 (285) 0.28 (3393) 0.124
Note: Number of observations in brackets.
aDummy variables.
b Significance values are based on one-way analyses of variance (one-way ANOVAs).
1 See Liebig and Sousa-Poza (2004) for a discussion of the impact of qualification on the migration
decision.
2 We also conducted separate analyses for employed individuals with respect to a variety of job-related
characteristics. Among these characteristics, only tenure has a significant (negative) impact on duration. The
full results are available from the authors upon request.
3 As an alternative approach, we run a set of logit regressions, with ‘1’ depicting the people that decided to
change their place of residence in 1998 or 1999 and ‘0’ being the non-movers. The results are qualitatively
very similar to those of the Cox regressions. They are available from the authors upon request.
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expected (negative) sign—as children lead to a tax deduction—but owing to the relatively
small size of this deduction, it is not significant (549.2; std error 993.3). The impact of
changes in marital status is a priori ambiguous, because—depending on the cantonal tax
law—marriage may or may not lead to an increased tax burden for a given household
income. Thus, it is not surprising that it has no significant impact either (coefficient
2495.2; std error 2327.4). As there was no substantial overhaul in the tax system in the
corresponding period, there was no expectation of a strong time trend, which is also
confirmed (coefficient 172.1; std error 425.7). However, if changes of residency are
indeed tax related, then there should be a correlation between the error terms of the first-
difference equation and past migration. Yet Kendall’s tau is equal to 0.063019 and far from
significant (p ¼ 0.350304). Again, migration seems not to have an impact on the tax
burden.
If the tax burden has no significant impact on the migration decision, what else could
matter? In an attempt to answer this question, we perform an analysis using alternative
explanations of internal migration in Switzerland, again with the Cox proportional hazard
rate model. The results are presented in Table 4. Whereas Model 6 only includes basic
sociodemographic variables, Model 7 adds subjective, location-related characteristics to
the analysis, i.e., living standard satisfaction, noisy environment, problems with pollution
and problems with vandalism. These variables correspond to a variety of public goods
Table 2. Determinants of internal migration—Cox proportional hazard rate model
Model 1
coefficient
std
error
Model 2
coefficient
std
error
Model 3
coefficient
std
error
Household size 0.162*** 0.048 0.048 0.051 0.162*** 0.049
Child of school
agea
0.180 0.195 0.144 0.194 0.174 0.195
Age 0.076*** 0.006 0.066*** 0.006 0.076*** 0.006
Low educationa,b 0.237 0.192 0.263 0.193 0.236 0.192
High educationa,b 0.165 0.177 0.127 0.177 0.172 0.179
Unemploymenta,c 0.561** 0.225 0.615*** 0.229 0.559** 0.225
Employmenta,c 1.523*** 0.416 1.497*** 0.419 1.520*** 0.416
Foreignera 0.400** 0.163 0.234 0.165 0.406** 0.164
Home ownershipa 1.282*** 0.180
External childcarea 0.312 0.236
Agglomerationa 0.008 0.127
Italian language
regiona,d
0.303 0.326
French language
regiona,d
0.022 0.130
N 3674 3674 3674
x2 307.81*** 362.25*** 308.31***
P[Dx2]
(ref.: model 1)
0.00 0.81
Note: Coefficients are exponentiated. Regressions are conducted for individuals older than 20. The
explanatory variables reflect the characteristics in the first wave.
aDummy variables.
b Reference category: middle education.
c Reference category: non-employment.
d Reference category: German language region
*, **, *** significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively
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(general quality of life, infrastructure and public safety) and therefore provide an
opportunity to control for these factors.1 Among these variables, only noise has a significant
impact onmigration, although the variable on living standard satisfaction is on themargin of
significance. Nor does this picture alter when we control for income and tax burden (Model
8). Again, tax burden has no significant impact, even after we control for public goods.
Obviously, neither tax burden nor the perceived characteristics of the location included
in Table 4 contribute substantially to explaining migration behaviour in Switzerland.
However, the Swiss Household Panel, unlike other panels, also contains information on
a total of 32 possible reasons for migrating. In Table 5, we group these reasons into four
categories: accommodation-related reasons, personal reasons, locality characteristics and,
for the remainder, other reasons.
Table 6 depicts the reasons most often mentioned as the first motive for migration.
Although we analyse only migrations involving changes in place of residency (i.e.,
excluding migrations within a community), accommodation-related factors clearly dom-
inate. More than a quarter of all respondents stated the desire for a larger home; another
11% aspired to home ownership. This result is in line with a strand of research that
emphasises the importance of the housing market on migration (see e.g., Cameron and
Muellbauer, 1998; Jones and Hyclak, 1994). However, location-related factors do not
figure prominently among the reasons for migration. It should also be noted that no
respondent reported taxes as the prime motive for migration.
Table 3. Determinants of internal migration including tax burden—Cox proportional hazard
rate model
Model 4 Model 5
coefficient standard error coefficient standard error
Tax burden 1.967 0.799 0.136 0.406
Household income 3 106 1.027 0.815 1.529 1.022
Household size 0.134** 0.057
Child of school agea 0.204 0.220
Age 0.086*** 0.007
Low educationa,b 0.082 0.220
High educationa,b 0.042 0.207
Unemploymenta,c 0.305 0.260
Employmenta,c 1.064** 0.514
Foreignera 0.303 0.186
N 2760 2760
x2 3.64 236.36***
P[Dx2] (ref.: model 4) 0.00
Note: Coefficients are exponentiated. Regressions are conducted for individuals older than 20. The
explanatory variables reflect the characteristics in the first wave.
aDummy variables.
bReference category: middle education.
c Reference category: non-employment.
d Reference category: German language region.
*, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
1 As has been noted in the study by Feld and Kirchga¨ssner (2001, p. 192), inclusion of quality-of-life
variables also proxies ‘to some extent for housing price differences since these variables would presumably be
capitalised into the price of housing.’ They thus partly compensate for the lack of housing variables in the
model.
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For a further analysis of the reasons, we ran a multinomial logit with ‘other reasons’ as
the reference category. The results from the pooled regression of the second and third wave
(see Table 7) reveal that migration motives are rather randomly distributed among the
population, with one notable exception—locality-related characteristics matter more for
highly qualified people than for other population groups. Furthermore, migration is
significantly more likely to occur because of accommodation-related or personal reasons
than for the other two types of reasons.
7. Conclusions
The impact of taxation on migration has attracted much interest among economists and
policy-makers alike. On the one hand, it is acknowledged that fiscal federalism may be
efficiency enhancing in that it allows fiscal policy to adjust to local preferences. As a result,
many OECD countries are discussing the issue of tax decentralisation. In Germany, for
example, a reform of fiscal federalism currently under discussion aims at providing more
taxation autonomy to the La¨nder.1 One important objection against such policies relates to
the potential negative spillovers from tax competition among local governments, i.e., local
Table 4. Public goods, taxes and internal migration—Cox proportional hazard rate model
Model 6
coefficient
std
error
Model 7
coefficient
std
error
Model 8
coefficient
std
error
Household size 0.164*** 0.048 0.154*** 0.048 0.129** 0.057
Child of school agea 0.254 0.194 0.227 0.194 0.218 0.220
Age 0.080*** 0.005 0.078*** 0.005 0.087*** 0.007
Low educationa,b 0.275 0.192 0.306 0.193 0.116 0.220
High educationa,b 0.201 0.177 0.221 0.177 0.094 0.207
Foreignera 0.406** 0.163 0.372** 0.165 0.302 0.189
Living standard
satisfaction
0.055* 0.033 0.029 0.040
Noisy
environmenta
0.468*** 0.142 0.416*** 0.162
Problems with
pollutiona
0.121 0.176 0.190 0.204
Problems with
vandalisma
0.226 0.173 0.281 0.203
Tax burden 0.138 0.403
Household
income
3 106
1.776* 0.988
N 3674 3664 2754
x2 299.34*** 313.33*** 239.69***
P[Dx2] (reference:
basic model)
0.01
Note: Coefficients are exponentiated. Regressions are conducted for individuals older than 20. The
explanatory variables reflect the characteristics in the first wave.
aDummy variables.
b Reference category: middle education.
*, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
1 See German Federal Minister of Finance, Hans Eichel, in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (2003).
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governments may engage in wasteful competition for taxpayers that may lead to sub-
optimally low rates.
However, tax competition will only materialise if actual migration is tax induced. Yet
prior empirical studies on the impact of tax competition on migration behaviour have been
limited by a lack of comparable data in an international context and a lack of variation in
tax rates internally. Only in Switzerland, with a unique tax system in which income taxes
are determined primarily at the local level, can the effect of income taxation on migration
be adequately studied. Nevertheless, earlier studies on tax competition in Switzerland that
have been generally supportive of the notion of tax competition have had to rely on
aggregated data associated with inherent endogeneity problems. Therefore, such ap-
proaches and models may have been inadequate to the task of analysing individual
determinants of migrant location choices. Only with the recent establishment of the Swiss
Household Panel has a rich micro-level dataset finally become available for the analysis of
taxation’s impact on migration behaviour.
Table 5. Classification of migration reasons
Category Reason for moving
Accommodation Home too small
Accommodation too expensive
Accommodation too large
Lack of garden/terrace
Aspire to ownership
Personal Change of personal situation
Life event
Inheritance/donation
Change of work/end of studies
Separation/divorce
Problems with neighbours or landlord
Locality Commuting
Desire for countryside
Environment not suited to children
Bad/unpleasant environment
Lack of green areas
Noise
Traffic
Air quality
Dirty, chaotic area
Parking problems
Too many foreigners
Problems with drugs
School quality, image
School beginning/change to another school
Tax burden
Health insurance premiums
Problems in administration, politics, society
Other Want more comfort
Offer by coincidence
Want to change
Other
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Themost important conclusion of our analysis is that tax rates clearly have no significant
impact on the migration decision. Nevertheless, the fact that few, if any, migrants are
driven by tax considerations does not rule out a tax burden influence over the migration
choices of some very high earners. Indeed, some such prominent cases have recently
received much public attention.1 Yet our analysis suggests that these cases are the
exception. Furthermore, these legal translocations seldom involve a physical migration and
are therefore beyond the focus of our study. Thus, large-scale, tax-induced migration
seems highly unlikely, even in the Swiss context in which such relocation would be possible
without a job change. Rather, our results point to the importance of the housing market in
migration decisions. That is, most migration within Switzerland appears related to the
Table 6. The most important migration reasons
Reason %
Home too small 25.9
Change of personal situation 15.8
Aspire to ownership 10.9
Want more comfort 8.1
Other reason 7.7
Accommodation too expensive 6.7
Offer by coincidence 4.3
Change of work/end of studies 3.8
Separation/divorce 3.0
Accommodation too large 2.6
Commuting 2.2
Table 7. Determinants of internal migration—multinomial logit
Accommodation
coefficient std error
Personal
coefficient std error
Locality
coefficient std error
Constant 0.949* 0.488 1.152** 0.550 0.300 0.927
Household size 0.072 0.093 0.181 0.115 0.286 0.208
Child of school
agea
0.130 0.379 0.084 0.466 1.032 0.663
Age 0.006 0.011 0.015 0.012 0.033 0.023
Low educationa,b 0.355 0.374 0.099 0.417 0.331 0.817
High educationa,b 0.382 0.390 0.609 0.433 1.143* 0.604
Foreignera 0.008 0.325 0.636 0.416 0.944 0.799
N 447
Pseudo-R2 0.064c
x2 26.65*
Note: Regressions are conducted for individuals older than 20. The explanatory variables reflect the
characteristics prior to the move. The reference category is ‘other reasons’.
aDummy variables.
b Reference category: middle education.
cThe pseudo-R2 measure is that of Nagelkerke (1991).
*, **, *** significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.
1 The perhaps most prominent examples are the German sportsmen Michael Schumacher and Jan Ulrich,
both of whom moved to Switzerland.
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housing market, which may be explained by the relatively low home-ownership rates in
Switzerland.
To what degree can the results of our national study be broadened to the general issue of
tax competition? As a highly federalist country with three languages, migration barriers in
Switzerland should be higher than in unitary countries with only one official language.
However, because Switzerland is a very small country, commuting across linguistic zones is
not a problem of distance. What remains unclear is the effect of the high per capita income
in Switzerland on the inclination to engage in tax-induced migration. On the one hand,
a higher income increases the monetary value of each percentage point of tax rate
difference. On the other, the high income level in Switzerland has resulted in a very high
living standard by international comparison, which might reduce the overall inclination to
migrate for tax savings.
All things considered, it can be concluded that, if tax competition is virtually absent in
a country with a decentralised tax structure, it should not have a great impact on
international migration—at least as far as migration across linguistic zones is concerned.
Therefore, it seems improbable that disparities in tax rates, such as those within the
European Union, will have a large impact on international migration. This finding also
casts some doubts on recent policies in various OECD countries that aim to attract certain
migrant groups (e.g., highly skilled migrants) through tax incentives.
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Appendix
Table A1. Definitions of selected variables and terms used in the analysis
Variable/term Definition
Tax burden Annual tax payments divided by household income. Prior to
2001, tax assessment lags two years behind, i.e., reported
tax payments in 1999 are based on the income in 1997.
Household head Person above 20 earning the highest income in the house-
hold. If this maximum income is reported by more than one
person in the household, the oldest respondent among these
was chosen.
Low education Equal to 1 if respondent has less than an apprenticeship or
A-level; 0 otherwise
High education Equal to 1 if respondent has a university degree; 0 otherwise
Household size Number of individuals living in the household
Child of school age Equal to 1 if a child under the age of 16 is living in the
household; 0 otherwise
Foreigner Equal to 1 if respondent does not have a Swiss nationality;
0 otherwise
Job satisfaction Measures the overall job satisfaction on a scale from 0 (‘not
at all satisfied’) to 10 (‘completely satisfied’)
Living standard
satisfaction
Measures the overall satisfaction with the standard of living
on a scale from 0 (‘not at all satisfied’) to 10 (‘completely
satisfied’)
Noisy environment Equal to 1 if respondent perceived problems with noisy
external environment; 0 otherwise
Problems with pollution Equal to 1 if respondent perceived problems with pollution,
environment, linked to traffic or presence of industry;
0 otherwise
Problems with vandalism Equal to 1 if respondent perceived problems with vandalism
in the neighbourhood; 0 otherwise
External childcare Equal to 1 if respondent received regular external help for
childcare; 0 otherwise
Agglomeration Equal to 1 if respondent resides in a centre or suburban
community; 0 otherwise
Italian language region Equal to 1 if respondent resides in the Canton of Ticino;
0 otherwise
French language region Equal to 1 if respondent resides in the Cantons of Fribourg,
Geneva, Jura, Neuchaˆtel, Valais or Vaud; 0 otherwise
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